

*United States Marine Corps  
Command and Staff College  
Marine Corps University  
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## **MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES**

### **Is the United States Marine Corps the Best Organization to be Tasked with Providing Security to U.S. Diplomatic Missions?**

*An Examination of the Marine Security Guard Program and its Partnership  
with the U.S. Department of State*

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
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Jeffrey Thomas, United States Department of State,  
Diplomatic Security Service  
AY 00-01

Mentor: Dr. Richard Dinardo

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_

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Mentor: Lt Col Gregory Akers

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**Abstract**

Since 1948 Marines have been formally tasked with providing security to U.S. diplomatic missions. Are there better alternatives to the USMC? Marines provide embassy security in partnership with the Diplomatic Security Service; this partnership can be improved to the betterment of the program and the missions they protect. Since its inception in 1791, Department of State diplomats have been escorted and protected by U.S. Marines. What started as an ad-hoc partnership of necessity has evolved into a formal partnership between organizations. However, Marines are trained war fighters and are a stark contradiction to the diplomats who traditionally inhabit embassies. Approximately 30% of all MSGs are removed from the program either in training or at post. This is because the MSG Program sets conduct and academic standards that must be upheld, and do in-fact enforce discipline on their personnel. Embassy security is a partnership with the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). While awkward, this unique partnership works quite well in spite of general misunderstandings. Marines and RSOs have a different ethos and style in approaching embassy security. DSS has a minimal presence during the training of MSGs. This lack of presence can add to future misunderstandings at post and permits MSG trainers to approach embassy security from only a Marine perspective. This must change if the program is to continue to excel. The Marine Corps has agreed to staff an additional thirty-four posts. This will place a greater burden on sending MSGs to post in spite of the high standards demanded on them. MSG training is professional, it removes personnel determined not able to serve successfully, and prepares the remainder for the unique demands of embassy security duty.

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*Eternal vigilance is the price of freedom.*

— Thomas Jefferson

**Partners in Security: the U.S. Department of State and the Marine Corps**

Embassies are diplomatic missions to foreign governments. They are intended to be open mediums where both the host government and guest nation can interact on a far-reaching variety of issues. Topics can range from cultural exchanges and consular services to the most urgent of diplomatic notes and demarches. Embassies are designed to be transnational forums between nations. Trade, tourism, economic and military assistance, as well as political exchanges are all day-to-day activities of an embassy.

Embassies are staffed with some of the most scholarly and best-educated people found in public service. Surprisingly, most embassies, regardless of country, are modeled similarly - American embassies are no different. Although similar by function, an American embassy is in one way, quite different. Upon walking into the main entrance of an American embassy, you are greeted by a U.S. Marine, an elite war-fighter, complete with uniform, a high and tight haircut, and sidearm. This presence is an apparent contradiction to the spirit of an embassy; noted by both host governments and U.S. embassy employees alike. Embassies, consulates, and interest sections (also known generically as missions) fall under the purview of the Department of State, the oldest department in the executive branch.

This paper will examine the embassy security partnership between the Marine Corps and the Department of State, specifically, the Diplomatic Security Service with regards to determining: is the Marine Corps the best organization to provide security to diplomatic missions. What are the major concerns facing today's Marine Security Guard



(MSG) program? Are there viable alternatives to having Marines serve in America's overseas diplomatic missions? In order to weigh the pros and cons of the MSG program, it is necessary to understand the origins of the program and some of its past and current problems. The MSG program has a complicated history that has experienced controversy, blurred lines of command and control, and mission responsibilities. While the program is currently well regarded, it is not excelling to its maximum potential.

### **Genesis of the MSG Program**

The State Department and the Marine Corps have a long and rich history of joint endeavors and mutual cooperation in foreign diplomacy and international security. A common and constant thread has always been present between the State Department and the Marines. Diplomacy in unstable environments, expanding the U.S. presence overseas, protecting U.S. business interests, and projecting U.S. national power through its military presence, drew the unlikely of candidates together. It is a partnership of necessity and convenience, an odd but necessary mix between civilian and military affairs. Yet since 1798, this relationship has been critical to early American foreign policy achievements, and in later years, the successive projection of U.S. national power onto the world stage. Marines have traditionally been tasked to provide protective services for U.S. personnel and property in both littoral and international settings. As America emerged onto the world stage, expanded trade, and sent diplomats to other nations, the Marines continued to play a greater role:

The Marine Corps has a historical reputation for service in expeditionary environments and in crisis...In fact, of all the services, the Marine Corps is the one most culturally predisposed towards small scale conflicts requiring extensive and delicate politico-military interaction. <sup>1</sup>

Over the years, the Marine Corps has firmly established a role in our national defense; a modern force in readiness that can respond to the full spectrum of today's warfare; a valuable instrument of U.S. national power. In the past, that was not always the case. As the Marines fought for a greater role in our nation's national defense, they have also been designated by default, the group to address: "other duties as the President may direct."<sup>2</sup> In 1900 Navy regulations specifically mentioned that the President "retained the constitutional power to assign the Marines as he saw fit."<sup>3</sup>

By the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, Marines had already established a relationship with the Department of State in escorting diplomats and protecting legations; however, it was the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 that not only gave the Marines an epic saga, but the beginning of a firm partnership with the State Department in securing U.S. missions. The Boxer Rebellion was a serious threat to international diplomats living in China. At times, the situation was critical. For fifty-five days, fifty Marines fought alongside an international adhoc force, defended a portion of the international Legation Quarter in Peking, and held-out against a numerous foe until an international army could relieve the beleaguered legation.<sup>4</sup>

This was the beginning of one of the most romantic eras of Marine Corps lore, "The China Marine." As China remained unstable, Marine security detachments in Peking, Shanghai and Tientsin were reinforced. At one point, 500 Marines were assigned to the U.S. Legation in Peking. Legation duty in exotic China was considered the best of all overseas assignments. This afforded Marines the opportunity to live far beyond their normal standard of living.

Marines would stay in China until the last days of the Chinese Nationalist Government. It is the timeless romance of the “China Marine,” serving in exotic lands, and the lure of a higher quality of life, that to this day continues to attract MSG recruits to the program.

During World War II, sixty Marines were assigned to the U.S. Embassy in London. As WW II drew to a close and a bipolar world became a reality, the Soviet Union emerged as a direct challenge to U.S. democratic values and institutions. As the Soviets placed eastern European nations into their sphere of influence, it quickly became apparent that the Soviets were aggressive in expanding the “Communist world revolution.” While checked militarily by the U.S., the Soviets, nonetheless, resorted to alternative means of aggression in the form of spying and espionage. In particular, Soviet intelligence desired access to U.S. diplomats and their missions. “The Soviets had a well known record of technical penetrations of U.S. and other western diplomatic facilities.”<sup>5</sup>

The post WW-II era saw Marines transition from protecting lives and property to securing classified material. By the late 1940s, Marines were providing static guard posts in numerous U.S. diplomatic missions around the world. In 1947, Chiefs of Missions were queried as to whether Marines would be welcome and useful as guards at their posts, the answer was an unequivocal, yes. Civilian guards had proven to be unreliable, untrustworthy and expensive.<sup>6</sup> These initial Marine embassy security taskings culminated in the first formal Memorandum of Agreement between the State Department and the Marine Corps in 1948. Requests for security guard volunteers went out to the fleet. From there, the program gradually grew. In 1949 eighty-three MSGs were trained and deployed. By 1953 the program had six officers and 676 men, a formal MSG school was established in 1954; by 1967 the number of MSGs was near 1000.<sup>7</sup>

Section 562 of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 authorized the Secretary of the Navy to assign enlisted members of the Naval Service to serve as “custodians” at embassies, legations, and consulates. In 1956 this authorization was incorporated into title ten of the U.S. code.<sup>8</sup>

### **The Current MSG Program - Duties and Responsibilities**

Today, the program consists of 1,350 Marines assigned to 125 embassies and consulates. This includes the MSG Battalion Headquarters in Quantico and eight regional company commands located worldwide. This number of Marines constitutes roughly one half of the people needed for one Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). The true significance in this amount of personnel is that once assigned as MSGs, the Marines are detailed to the State Department until the conclusion of their assignments. Being assigned to the State Department, they generally cannot be recalled by the Corps and deployed on another assignment.

While Marines in boot camp are initially trained to be aggressive war-fighters, MSG school, in many ways, is the direct opposite. In essence, a MSG detachment is defensive in nature, the primary responsibility for embassy security being in the hands of the host government. This is important to understand and is critical for the program to be successful on a worldwide basis. The primary mission of a MSG is: “To provide internal security at designated U.S. diplomatic and consular facilities to prevent the compromise of classified material and equipment, and to provide protection for U.S. mission personnel.”<sup>9</sup>

Marine Security Guard duty is specialized. MSGs are tasked with internal security, access control, as well as safeguarding information, property and protecting

personnel in the chancery and consular sections. MSGs also secure the immediate property of the designated U.S. diplomatic site.<sup>10</sup> It is only in the gravest of situations that Marines are allowed to respond outside of the chancery or to actually protect any principal officers at post. Protection of U.S. embassy personnel is provided either by the host government security services or special agents of the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). These are the same agents that perform regional security officer (RSO) assignments at U.S. Embassies and are tasked with the operational control of the MSG detachment.

Besides controlling access into key areas of the chancery, MSGs perform random inspections of the workspaces of cleared Americans at post. There, they check to see if classified material is either exposed or improperly secured. MSGs are also trained to deter and delay hostile mobs or attackers from entering the chancery until the host government security forces can respond. Additionally, MSGs respond to fire alarms, bomb threats, and apprehend the rare intruder.

This job description refutes an assumption commonly held by the public, that MSGs are assigned to diplomatic missions not so much based on the terrorist/security threat, as many assume, but that they (MSGs) are deployed to missions that need to maintain the integrity of classified material. It is just that criterion that deems whether a post is given a MSG detachment. As a matter of policy, MSGs are not assigned to posts that do not store classified material within its walls, regardless of the “in-country security threat.” While terrorism and in-country security threats are important, they are of minor concern when determining whether to activate a new detachment. Because of these non-traditional duties, only Marines possessing the highest levels of maturity, discretion, and

records of performance are selected to become MSGs. Selection to attend MSG school is by no means assurance of an assignment to an embassy.

There are two types of MSGs: watch standers and detachment commanders. Watch standers must be at least a lance corporal (E-3) and have enough time in their enlistment to serve two - fifteen month tours. They must also agree to remain single while assigned to the billet. Detachment commanders are staff non commissioned officers (SNCOs), between the ranks of staff and master gunnery sergeant. They can be married and must serve two, eighteen-month tours. MSG - SNCOs are unique in that they are the only Marines who are non-commissioned officers to be assigned command positions.

The minimum detachment has a table of organization (T/O) of one detachment commander and five watch standers. This T/O fills one primary post (known as Post One, located at the main entrance to a mission) twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. The larger detachments located in such places as Cairo and Paris can have up to thirty MSGs staffing up to three or four internal posts. Posts with more than eighteen MSGs will have a second SNCO who is schooled to be an assistant detachment commander, in order to assist with the additional administrative and supervision duties that a larger detachment demands. Remarkably, the average age of a MSG is twenty-two.

The sensitive nature of diplomatic missions demands that young MSGs be tasked with protecting the U.S. national security in our diplomatic missions. Because of this, recruitment and training are crucial to the success or failure of the MSG program. The Marine Corps is acutely aware of this important responsibility, and they put considerable

resources into selection, training, and preparation of new MSGs, however, the program has not always had the high reputation that it currently enjoys.

### **The Moscow - MSG Detachment Debacle**

In 1986 Marine Security Guards Clayton Lonetree and Arnold Bracy were removed from MSG duty and charged with spying on behalf of the Soviet Union. Both were alleged to have permitted Soviet intelligence officers to enter the most sensitive areas of American Embassy Moscow (though never proven) to plant listening and recording devices and copy top secret, compartmentalized information. Incredibly, these alleged entries happened late at night while the MSGs were on duty, protecting the embassy. Additionally, Lonetree admitted to removing both secret and sensitive information to include embassy floor plans and passed it onto Soviet intelligence officers in exchange for financial remuneration. Lonetree also admitted to passing embassy ID photos and identified to his KGB handler, some U.S. Embassy employees as being CIA officers.

Both MSGs had been initially entrapped and recruited by “swallows,” attractive females working for the KGB. Only Lonetree was convicted and imprisoned. In the mid 1980s, the MSG Program was regarded as duty for mediocre Marines, thus conduct on the program was less than professional. Many drank to excess, fornicated with the wives of embassy staff officers, took illegal drugs, dealt on the local black markets, and overnighted with foreign national women in the bedrooms of the Marine house, in direct violation of a MSG directive forbidding such activity. In some posts MSG conduct resembled a fraternity party more than it did a professional military detachment. Out of twenty-eight MSGs, the Moscow Detachment, over a twelve month period (Feb 86 to Feb

87), had nineteen watch standers receive 34 NJP (non-judicial punishment) discipline violations resulting from nineteen separate incidents.<sup>11</sup> The MSG Program as well as the State Department was dealt a severe black eye. The Marine Corps received stinging criticism from the press and Congress alike. At one point, the State Department briefly considered researching the possibility of using either civilian personnel or another military branch such as the Army or Airforce to conduct embassy security duty.<sup>12</sup>

### **The Program Changes**

“The curse of Moscow Station” still haunts the MSG Program. It has taken almost two decades to shake the stigma associated with the MSG program of the 1970s and 80s. In 1987, a professionally trained Navy clinical psychologist, and a Marine counter intelligence officer were added to the MSG school. This was in direct response to congressional hearings from the MSG spy debacle in Moscow. In an effort to prevent a similar scenario today the psychologist is tasked with administering and interpreting a psychological profile survey to each MSG candidate; this survey is known as the Law Enforcement Assessment Development Report, or LEADR. The LEADR is given to all new MSG candidates in their first week of training. This assessment measures the potential for a student to be successful while assigned as a MSG.

The LEADR survey is not given to recruits while still in their previous assignments, before their arrival for training, for fear that some potentially good recruits may be scared-away. The current battalion psychologist is a lieutenant commander, USN. Because the psychologist is a member of the military, it has been judged that students will feel more at ease and will open up if test results indicate a need for more information.



Marine staff officers at MSG Battalion are quick to point out that a modern day “Lonetree” would never make it into today’s MSG school, let alone be assigned to a post. “A person like Lonetree was a loner, a mediocre performer with low self-esteem. He had a drinking problem that grew as he spent more time on the program.”<sup>13</sup> Intelligence vulnerabilities are inevitably linked to flaws in behavior that can be exposed for potential attack by host intelligence services. Because they are directly linked, the presence of the psychologist is a tremendous insurance policy in preventing another intelligence breakdown at the expense of the MSG Program. A recruit is generally not dropped due a poor LEADR result, rather both the psychologist and an instructor/advisor (IA) can observe the MSG candidate during the six weeks of training. Together, these two professionals make a formidable review team, observing the recruit as he/she reacts to security scenarios, stress-induced training, and fatigue. A Poor performance in training, in addition to an abnormal LEADR result makes the decision to drop a candidate easier.

The best proving ground for a new MSG is during training, where candidates are immersed in an embassy setting and must learn to work as a team. This is one of the reasons that the school is designed to emulate an embassy and requires all students to live in the upper floors. Recruits are forced to coalesce and work as a single unit. The ones that can’t adapt are removed from school before they become a problem for an embassy. The goal is to remove the poor performers while in training and not from post where improper conduct or performance can lead to larger problems for both an embassy and the MSG Program.

Instructors are looking for specific trip wires, the loner, the recruit who can’t accept criticism, large egos, excessive drinkers, and recruits with low self-esteem.

Recruits who will not divulge past problems or indiscretions are also not wanted. Some other traits that show potential for trouble at a post are individuals who have problems with conforming, impulsiveness, depression, boredom, social withdrawal, interpersonal relationships, and sociopath behavior. The LEADR survey will pick-up performance indicators as well as personality orientation and integrity controls. Another good tool for judging new MSGs is peer evaluations. During school, recruits get the opportunity to judge their classmates and put them into a rank order. Peer evaluations is a good indication of where a recruit is actually performing, as classmates inevitably will notice much more than class instructors can. If several peers indicate a shortfall in a student, instructors can examine that person closer in an effort to see if he/she performs one way in the presence of authority and then reverts back to their true self with their classmates<sup>14</sup>

Another technique used to remove potential problem Marines is the polygraph exam. Recruits whose LEADR survey, counter intelligence questionnaire, and instructor interview indicate a conflict or the possible withholding of information, will be told that they are to be given a polygraph examination. This is done in an effort to have the MSG voluntarily reveal the potentially embarrassing or damaging information. If deception is noted during the exam, the MSG is given another opportunity to divulge specific information in an effort to find the truth. This is done because there are times when young adults will attempt to withhold information that is more personally embarrassing than an actual threat to embassy security.

All MSGs assigned to a critical counter intelligence threat post (CCTP) receive, prior to their departure, both general and country specific counter intelligence prevention and awareness training. Upon completion of that CCTP tour, returning MSGs are again

given the LEADR survey to see if their behavior profile has changed. A Marine returning from a hostile intelligence post will not be polygraphed as a matter of routine; this is consistent with current State Department policy towards their employees. The MSG may be directed to take a polygraph if the second LEADR survey results indicated a change in behavior when compared to the first survey and the battalion's counter intelligence officer also feels that it is appropriate. Refusal to take the polygraph at any time is grounds for immediate termination from the MSG Program.

The MSG Program continually assesses and re-evaluates their personnel throughout their time on the program, not just when they enter. To date, the MSG Battalion psychologist is extremely pleased with this review and states that the continuing evaluation portion puts it above anything offered by the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, the Navy Seals, or Army-Delta units.<sup>15</sup> The Department of State, as a matter of policy, will not issue either a psychological profile exam or a polygraph exam to their employees. This includes DSS agents even though many in DSS welcome screening tests as initial benchmarks in tracking both potential conduct and performance of their people. The MSG Program is far ahead of the Department of State in preventing intelligence vulnerabilities in an embassy.

The Marines are proactive while the State Department is forced to react to past law breaking, malfeasance, and intelligence offenses, and then must work from the incident backwards, in order to ascertain damage and find the specific reasons why the employee committed wrong doing; and in an effort to determine damage assessment, when. No MSG candidate assessment tool is used exclusively; it is the combination of scientific measurement *and* personal review by competent authorities that make the

process effective. The MSG Battalion is convinced in reviewing recruits that past behavior is a clear indication of future behavior.

### **Recruitment and Retention of MSGs**

There are several challenges facing today's MSG Program, recruitment and retention are two of them. MSGs are recruited from the entire Corps, infantry being the largest supplier of personnel. Because standards are high, the MSG Battalion has prevented it from becoming an assignment for low performing Marines. Marines are assigned to the program on a voluntary basis. This ensures high motivation to a program that is sensitive, tedious, and potentially dangerous.

However, because the program looks for the best-enlisted Marines and SNCOs, other commands do not always encourage their best Marines to join and do not always assist the MSG Battalion in informing the enlisted ranks of when the MSG Battalion is recruiting and screening. The Corps, in an attempt to encourage Marines to enter MSG duty, counters this by considering MSG duty the same as drill instructor and recruiter duty, making it highly regarded by promotion boards resulting in better potential for promotion. Another reason that the MSG Battalion is constantly dealing with staffing problems is due to the high level of turnover, typically 40% of the program rotates each year. Some go to onward MSG posts, but all rotate either back to the Marine Corps or return to civilian life. Historically, anywhere between 20% and 30% are washed out in training and another 3% to 10%, varying year to year, are removed for cause (RFC) from post.<sup>16</sup>

In fiscal year 2000, MSG Battalion identified 548 recruits eligible for training; however, once the in process begins, this number of recruits melts considerably. Sixty-

five of the initial 548 remained in other billets and did not report for duty. The remaining 483 reported for training, spread-out in five classes over the school year. Fifty-three of the 483 that reported did not meet pre-requisites, e.g. medical or financial complications, a change in marriage status, or decided to dropout, etc. As school proceeded, ninety-four were subsequently dropped for various reasons. Eventually, three hundred and thirty-three graduated and were sent to overseas posts. In summation, fiscal year 2000 realized a 30% attrition rate. Almost 20% of the 30% attritted, were dropped from the formal training portion of MSG School.<sup>17</sup>

Another challenge faces the Marine Corps; both the State Department and the Marine Corps have agreed to staff an additional thirty-four MSG detachments in the next few years. Conceivably, MSG Battalion may have to recruit and train an additional 300 to 370 MSGs a year. When the expansion is completed, the MSG Battalion will have over 1500 Marines assigned around the world.<sup>18</sup> Currently, MSG Battalion, trains five classes of MSGs, consisting of approximately 120 Marines per class each year (ten to fifteen of any given class being new detachment commanders). These new overseas missions will require an extra fifty to seventy-five additional MSGs per class. This will place increased demands upon the fleet to offer additional quality Marines for MSG duty.

The current demand for FY2000 was 625 MSG candidates in order to arrive at 375 watch standers and fifty detachment commanders that need to be sent to post each year.<sup>23</sup> Given that the MSG Program will continue to expand, the key to future MSG success is in lowering the percentage of training washouts. This can be done by more in-depth screening and recruiting stronger candidates who are more likely to complete training and be deployed to a mission. However, the primary success of the MSG

Program is attributed to having highly motivated quality volunteers and *not* reluctant draftees. Some senior ranking Marines see MSG duty as an unnecessary drain of quality combat Marines needed for traditional sea deployments. The counter-argument to this is that a Marine, after MSG duty, is more self-reliant, and possesses numerous leadership traits highly desired by the Corps. However, since the Marine Corps is committed to fielding quality Marines into the MSG Program, they must keep it strictly on a voluntary basis. One way to address this shortfall is to offer an increase in the enhanced specialist pay for MSGs assigned to embassy duty, similar to military personnel who receive jump pay or EOD pay. In any event, it could be potentially catastrophic to the program to have impressed and disgruntled Marines working in both an overseas and a diplomatic setting. It can be surmised that the motivation factor is an incalculable asset to the success of the program.

Initially, a recruited Marine is first screened for suitability by his/her parent command. A MSG review team, working out in the field, on specific recruitment drives, gives most of the candidates a further review. Although the MSG Program is a partnership with the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), DSS does not partake in the reviewing of MSG candidates in the field. While their absence is not a critical flaw, their presence could only add to the caliber of reviewers in looking for the best candidates. However, MSG Battalion personnel performing this task are normally former detachment commanders and are well versed in reviewing the minimal qualification threshold needed for potential MSGs to adequately perform in an embassy. Approximately 65% of all MSG candidates are pre-screened before selection. Qualified Marines that are accepted move onto formal MSG training in Quantico, VA.

### **The MSG Training Phase**

MSG training is intensive and takes place in a dedicated building, whose ground floor is an actual mock-up of an embassy. Students live in the upper floors of Marshall Hall, named for a MSG killed in the 1968 Vietcong attack on the U.S. embassy in Saigon; to date, eleven MSGs have been killed on station. MSG students man static posts and MSG Battalion offices serve as embassy sets for security violation sweeps and react drills; training is demanding, both physically and academically.

Potential MSGs receive six intensive weeks of schooling while detachment commanders go through an eight-week course. Detachment commanders immediately begin their supervisory duties by assuming a percentage of the new students as a detachment while in training. All MSGs receive counterintelligence (CI) training, MSGs assigned to countries designated critical for hostile intelligence receive an additional post specific class of counterintelligence methods and awareness.

Many detachment commanders were formerly enlisted watch standers. This greatly adds to the credibility and supervision capability of the program. It is in training that a large dropout and removal rate occurs. While this may seem alarming, a close review of dropouts actually reinforces a strong vote of confidence for the program. Several MSG Battalion officers pointed out that a good fleet Marine might not necessarily make a good Marine Security Guard.

Many Marines are removed in the first week of training. One of the reasons for this is because MSG personnel do not interview all candidates before they are transferred into the program. Additionally, there are many intangibles that do not always come to light in the initial screening process, some see what is truly demanded from them

on the program and drop-out; others are dropped for excess weight, dental, medical, and family complications. Others are dropped for drugs, financial vulnerabilities, and for possessing psychological or social trends that indicate they will not be successful on the program.

The purpose of this phase is to weed-out Marines who may cause problems at a mission. These potential problems can range from immature behavior to the possibility of being recruited by a hostile intelligence service. While immature behavior and judgement are undesirable, becoming a foreign intelligence asset is tantamount to a catastrophe to both the MSG Program and the worldwide DSS embassy security program.

### **MSG School Attrition**

Most removals from training are for academics or maturity and judgement shortfalls, twenty-one and fifty-six recruits in FY 2000 respectively. While academics, firearms and physical requirements have pre-established standards, judgement and maturity standards can be very subjective. The presence of both a trained psychologist and experienced instructor/advisors with past MSG experience, lend credence to the decision to remove a recruit from training. Rarely is the psychologist's recommendation for removal overruled by the MSG Battalion's commanding officer, a Marine colonel.

So while the washout rate is high, this is actually an affirmation to the high standards demanded by the program. The key to future success is to bring candidates to MSG school that will not drop out. It was pointed out by a battalion officer that an offense which could get you 15 days in the brig on a fleet assignment, will get you quickly removed from post, dropped from the MSG Program, and possibly separated from the Marine Corps. MSG Battalion should endeavor to spend even more time on



pre-screening potential MSGs before arrival. Again, experienced DSS agents could assist if requested. The contribution to this screening by DSS would only be as good as the caliber of special agent assigned to assist the MSG recruitment team; however, it is a resource that could be requested by MSG Battalion and taken advantage of.

A young Marine brings a tremendous amount of enthusiasm and esprit de corps to the program, but that same Marine may also lack vital maturity and sound judgement at this point in his/her career. This is to be expected from anyone in his or her early 20s, however, the sensitive nature of embassy duty does not allow for gross deviations in personal conduct or professional performance. Considering that MSGs literally have the “keys to the kingdom,” this is an incredible amount of responsibility to be given to young, enlisted personnel, of which only a minimum possess more than a basic high school education.

All MSGs must receive a top-secret security clearance. This is a higher clearance than what many commissioned officers normally receive. The clearance is necessary because MSGs routinely seize unsecured classified material within a post and secure it for the embassy’s regional security officer. It is for these reasons that selection standards and attrition rates are so high. MSGs, working in this type of environment, under minimal supervision, outweigh the responsibilities given to a police officer of the same age working in the any U.S. city or municipality. Remarkably, the current rate of attrition in training is at the same level that it was in 1958, approximately 30 %.<sup>19</sup>

### **Increasing the Number of MSG Graduates**

MSG Battalion is looking to lower the percentage of training washouts and send them to diplomatic posts, or in other words, “Reduce attrition but retain quality and

standards.’<sup>20</sup> This strategy may be a risky maneuver. Academic or medical failures regardless of the candidate will not be passed. Where there is room for exception is in the group that exhibits judgment and maturity shortfalls. This is because this measurement is subjective.

Yet passing these potentially problematic Marines out to an embassy is literally playing Russian roulette, even if a marginal Marine is still motivated to go to post. The key to success in this area is to examine marginal MSG candidates further, and choose ones that show potential for continued improvement. This “high risk Marine” would then need to be sent to a detachment where both mature watch standers and a strong detachment commander are assigned, because it is assumed that several strong Marines can help guide a marginal Marine who has demonstrated poor judgement. Additionally, that Marine would be told of his/her weak rating and their need to shape-up before assignment.

The MSG Program has two options to choose from to reduce attrition; they can either graduate a higher percentage of candidates from the current numbers recruited, or they can throw the net out wider in an attempt to attract a greater number of qualified MSG candidates. The latter choice will have to be done at the expense of other Marine units that also require talented enlisted personnel.

### **The Detachment Commander**

Regardless of the direction chosen in passing recruits, MSG Battalion will not be as discretionary with its detachment commanders. The key to a successful MSG command is in the leadership qualities of the SNCOs. Surprisingly, the washout percentage for student detachment commanders is the same as watch standers. This is

because the detachment commanders are held to a higher benchmark than the enlistees are while in training. If any standard validates the professionalism of the MSG Program, it is this one. It has been described that the detachment commander is the crucial ingredient in keeping a detachment of young, single Marines in line. The SNCO is older, mature, and has frequently served as a watch stander on a past tour.

The detachment commander is allowed to have a spouse and family at post. This keeps him from overly socializing with those in his charge and getting pulled into the same social circle as the other junior MSGs. The detachment commander needs to maintain some distance from the rest of the detachment because he must interact with the RSO and other highly trained and educated embassy personnel to include at times, the ambassador. This separation also enables the detachment commander to not have his judgement clouded when making supervisory decisions. The detachment commander is the bridge between the enlisted Marines and the rest of post.

With that said, many have questioned why Marine officers do not supervise detachments? In the late 1950s and early 60s a captain was in charge of the Paris detachment, the largest of all detachments. MSG detachments are small and were never designed or intended to be led by Marine officers. Marine officers are trained to lead and manage much larger bodies of Marines; MSG officers can be found at the company level. NCO detachment commanders relate better to enlisted personnel, working closely with them and often explaining embassy security procedures as compared to officers who often give orders and simply expect them to be carried out. The post Lonetree response briefly witnessed Marine majors and captains sent to twelve critical intelligence Warsaw Pact detachments for four to six weeks in duration.

### **Discipline and Removals for Cause**

One of the criticisms leveled in the Moscow Station case was that the enlisted watch standers were not supervised properly; there is validity to that criticism. Because young people in any profession traditionally need more supervision and guidance, a second SNCO has since been added to detachments that have in excess of eighteen MSGs. This is a wise decision that once again, validates the standards of the program.

Because the role of the MSG at an embassy is of critical importance, the MSG Battalion will not tolerate sub-par performance or conduct. Or in other words, one can be removed from post almost as fast as one can be removed from training. The Marine Corps is looking to protect the integrity of the diplomatic post, and to protect the reputation of the Corps. There are about as many ways to get oneself removed from post, as there are reasons for wanting to join the program in the first place. As stated, MSGs are young, perhaps too young for embassy duty. Yet it is young enthusiastic personnel that make the program a success. As each generation has proven, young people will inevitably experience inappropriate behavior and moments of indiscretion; MSGs are no exception to this fact of life.

Only recently has the MSG Battalion established a database to track statistics of its MSG personnel. It is known that between 1995 and 2000, 3190 Marines have been graduated from Marshall Hall and sent to diplomatic posts, and in those six years, 207 have been removed for cause (RFC). This amounts to 6.5% of the total program.<sup>21</sup> While 207 is a considerable number, this amount is less than half of the 579 Marines that were removed in the 1980 to 1987 time frame, 196 of these RFCs took place in the 1985–87 period, a time known for lax performance standards and improper conduct.<sup>22</sup>

A comparison of RFCs from the 1980s to the RFCs of the late 1990s indicates that RFCs are down significantly and are not the problem that they used to be. Traditionally, most RFCs are in the European and Latin American posts. This is because: one, these companies have more detachments (50) than the other geographic zones and two, Europe and Latin America present more opportunities to engage in misconduct, in the form of more social functions and off-duty recreation.

While a removal for cause is an area of concern to the Marine Corps, there is some consolation in that approximately 97% of the RFCs are for reasons of conduct and *not* performance related. This percentage was independently validated through interviews with the battalion psychologist, operations officer, and judge advocate. While the range of reasons for RFCs vary, some do result in formal prosecution or courts marshal proceedings under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

The basis for RFCs in the years 1999 and 2000 were:

Lack of Maturity:	25
Alcohol Abuse:	21
Women in the Marine House:	8
Drugs:	4
Sexual Assault:	3
MSGs Sleeping with Other MSGs:*	3
Adultery:	3
Marriage While on the MSG Program:	3
Having Women in the Embassy's Core Access Area:	2
Negligent Discharge of a Weapon:	2 <sup>23</sup>

\* *In 1992 women were allowed to enter into the MSG Program.*

Of the above listed offenses, the most serious MSG infraction to the overall wellness of a diplomatic post is the offense of MSGs having foreign nationals (normally women) in the core access area (CAA) of an embassy. An offense of this nature may initiate a counterintelligence investigation from a host of agencies to include the

Diplomatic Security Service, CIA, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service. A non-cleared foreign national in the embassy, after hours, could possibly be a probe by a hostile intelligence service attempting to use and subvert the MSG in an effort to get into the embassy's sensitive areas. This is one of the reasons that discipline is critical to the MSG Program. Inappropriate conduct or performance can snowball into an intelligence vulnerability for a post. These standards again hark back to the MSG - Moscow and Vienna Embassy intelligence incidents of 1986. Discipline standards were not enforced then, much to the discredit of both the MSG Battalion and the Department of State.

From 1985-86, MSG Clayton Lonetree exhibited a sufficient number of conduct and performance problems to have warranted his removal from post, yet he was not removed. A lack of manpower consideration was as important then as it is today, but Lonetree was a Marine that needed to be removed for both conduct *and* performance infractions. The MSG company commander failed to concur with the detachment commander in removing Lonetree, even permitting him to extend due to Moscow being an undesired, hardship post.

If consistent discipline is not maintained, another incident of similar magnitude could easily erupt. This is why the MSG Battalion has installed numerous firewalls in an effort to prevent another Lonetree/Bracy espionage case. Even today, fourteen years after the Moscow Station episode, the MSG Battalion is acutely aware of what happened and is consumed in preventing another intelligence disaster involving the Marine Corps. Another intelligence scandal, regardless of the final merits of the case, could spell a congressional death knell for the MSG Program; this would cause an irreparable stain on the fine reputation of the Marine Corps.

### **Conduct Vs Performance and Off-Duty Incidents**

It is with some sense of relief that almost all discipline issues result from personal conduct and not professional performance, and upon examining the subject even closer, one can arrive at the primary source of MSG problems at post. While the MSG Battalion can not yet prove it statistically, all battalion officers interviewed are uniformly of the opinion that over 90% of MSG conduct problems result from two sources of trouble: women and alcohol. To their credit, MSG Battalion does not attempt to downplay it, and specifically mentions alcohol as a problem area for MSGs.<sup>24</sup>

Further, regardless of country, most of these incidents happen downtown, in nightclubs between the hours of 2am and 5am. While many of these instances can be written-off had they occurred in the U.S., they must be taken seriously in an overseas environment where international relations and host security liaison can be jeopardized. RSOs and at times, even ambassadors have been drawn into post-incident damage control. Due to the high visibility of MSGs, they must fully understand that their actions and decisions may have immediate strategic and political implications for their embassy, and the State Department as well.

Bar fights and drunken escapades resulting in verbal admonishment or non-judicial punishment (office hours) for stateside or fleet Marines can have the most serious of consequences for a MSG, whether or not the Marine is judged to be the guilty party. MSGs, with their grooming and fitness standards, stand out overseas and are literally beacons for local troublemakers. MSGs are single, have spending money, and merit considerable attention from the local female populations. This mix, combined with intoxicants and disgruntled local males, has the potential for trouble for MSGs in even

the safest of posts. Further, Marines are taught in basic training to be warriors; it is part of their ethos. A challenge or confrontation to a young Marine is not the same as a challenge or threat to just any twenty-something American male.

MSGs are instructed to avoid high-risk areas and back away from potential confrontations, but it does not always work in the MSGs favor. Most will not start a fight, but many will not necessarily back down either, especially if a threatened MSG is accompanied by his enlisted peers. In the past, numerous MSGs have been involved in fighting in overseas social clubs. Some incidents are readily extinguished and the MSGs depart for either another club or back to the Marine house. Some are not so lucky. In 1985 four MSGs were shot and killed while sitting in an off-limits, outdoor café in San Salvador. It was never determined if they were the intended targets, as many others were also killed and wounded. Due to the war, this area had been experiencing acts of violence.

Over the years, MSGs have been assaulted, some requiring hospitalization or at worst, an expensive medical evacuation to the U.S. mainland or Western Europe, all at the burden of the U.S. tax payer. Some of these confrontations result in permanent injuries. At this point the standard boilerplate answer of “boys will be boys” ceases to be an acceptable explanation. In 1991, after arguing and scuffling with locals over a place in line to enter a nightclub, a crowd of thugs jumped MSGs assigned to American Embassy Guatemala City. It quickly escalated and became critical as one MSG was beaten to unconsciousness and was being dragged away by numerous assailants.



It was only the intervention of an off-duty assistant regional security officer (ARSO) that saved him from further harm, a possible abduction, or worse. The locals then turned on the ARSO, nearly killing him as they bludgeoned him with clubs.

In July 1999, an off duty MSG was shot and seriously wounded in Vladivostok Russia. Allegedly, he had slammed a door to a nightclub. A local, interpreted this as a sign of extreme disrespect. The club had a reputation of being frequented by members of a local organized crime gang. In Moscow this past year, a group of MSGs was involved in a bar dispute whereupon they promptly departed. They were followed, and when they arrived at the embassy entrance, they were assaulted. Several MSGs were injured.<sup>25</sup>

The impact of these incidents is compounded in several ways, a seriously injured Marine, regardless of culpability will need to be removed from post. In a serious incident, a Marine judged to be the culprit would also normally be removed from post. So regardless of the circumstances, a post can lose several MSGs in one off-duty incident. Since it takes about a year to develop a new MSG (from recruitment to deployment) this manpower shortfall is a serious cause of concern for a detachment commander as well as the company and battalion commands. RSOs do not have to stand post, however, a detachment commander is part of the detachment, and in the absence of his people, would have to help and stand post.

Serious incidents involving injuries result in investigations and possible damage in relations with the host police and local governments. When a RSO gets a phone call at 4am informing him that MSGs have been involved in a confrontation, he is not interested in seeing who was in the right. His first concern (after MSG welfare) is in ascertaining if the incident will damage future police support for embassy security. Most

of these incidents are avoidable. Yet the nature of young single Marines is to go where the girls are. More often than not, the girls are in the large, crowded clubs that do not get lively until the late hours. This is why most incidents occur between 2am and 5 am.

After a series of incidents in the summer of 2000, in which MSGs were injured while in off-duty status, the DSS Director of Operations (the military equivalent of a two star general) sent an urgent cable to all RSOs. It stated:

...These incidents again remind us of the security risks concomitant with our MSG presence overseas...the MSGs remain highly visible representatives of the U.S. As such, they are attractive targets to terrorists, criminals, hostile intelligence, thugs and others who may harbor anti-American sentiments. Establish the appropriate threat and implement effective counter measures...reduce the exposure of your MSGs to the specified threat...keeping your MSGs away from areas frequented by nefarious individuals will substantially mitigate some of the risk.<sup>26</sup>

MSGs are extremely valuable personnel, neither the Department of State nor the Marine Corps can afford to have them involved or injured in incidents that are avoidable. MSG Battalion will not generate any conduct or curfew policy on a worldwide basis. They defer these decisions to the eight regional MSG company commands, all commanded by lieutenant colonels.

Ultimately, it is up to the RSO and the detachment commander to work out plans to prevent late night incidents. These are the proper personnel for making this type of management decision. Usually, if a significant incident has occurred, the establishment is put off limits. In many posts, a buddy system is now in place where MSGs must travel in pairs. The reasoning is to keep them safer and out of trouble; the thought being that each can lookout for the other and avoid potential trouble.

When asked if it might be advisable to relax grooming standards and let MSGs grow their hair longer and wear civilian attire on duty in an attempt to have MSGs blend

in more, it was met with a universal objection. The collective answer being that the typical Marine “high and tight” and uniform keep the Marine identified as to who he is and the reason he is at post. MSG standards, while regarded as strict by some, keep him from being co-opted or “civilianized” by the embassy community.

Both MSG Battalion officers and DSS management are in agreement with this standard. The fact that Marines are assigned to posts to be an overt deterrence, one cannot argue with this concept. Both sides are willing to risk MSG security incidents in order to maintain the integrity of the program. Risk of future incidents are acceptable as long as the MSGs continue to be rigid in the executions of their assigned duties.

MSG personnel, are for the most part, extremely well behaved and do not experience these incidents at a rate that indicates it is a crisis. Informally, MSG Battalion staff feels that it is currently at an acceptable level; however, MSG commands should strive for zero incidents. That, unfortunately, is also an unrealistic goal. MSGs are no different than young police officers or federal agents in the U.S.; it is psychologically difficult to back away when confronted. But many a good police officer and federal agent have been fired or criminally prosecuted and even personally sued in the aftermath of an off-duty incident, regardless of who was determined to be the aggressor. MSGs must be aware of these potential outcomes.

The collective informal impression received from MSG personnel is that these things will continue to happen; they are probably correct. In response, MSG trainers need to send a stronger message to recruits about the overall impact of these incidents and how they affect an embassy in the eyes of the local government and media after the individual hangovers and bruises heal. The MSG Battalion’s judge advocate should

continue keeping in-depth statistical data on off-duty incidents in an attempt to examine trends for posts and regions, thus helping to prevent future occurrences.

### **Alternative MSG Candidates**

Because MSGs are on average, twenty-two years of age, a credible argument can be made that older, mature, and even married MSGs should be recruited in an effort to avoid maturity, judgement, and alcohol related problems. This may be true, but older, married MSGs would likely bring a different set of problems to a post, along the lines of routine family issues, housing, medical, and financial concerns. On the flip side, battalion officers state that older MSGs are only in their late 20s, and get into trouble on an equal footing to their younger colleagues who are in their early twenties. In addition, their MSG duties would not be consistent with their rank, experience, or training.

Ultimately, the best MSG program candidates appear to be young, single Marines. In a crisis, they need to be at the embassy and not concerned with the welfare of their families. In many ways, married Marines are possibly more vulnerable than young, single, enlisted personnel. Hostile intelligence agencies can gear their subversion techniques onto both older and married Marines, in the end their perceived advantage could easily be nullified. All people in all stages of life exhibit vulnerabilities that can be exploited. From 1987 to present, there is no definitive evidence that indicates older or married Marines would better prevent intelligence or discipline problems. It seems that their alternative problems could be more complicated and expensive as compared to the traditional watch stander.

MSGs also need to be physically fit. They participate in react drills, wear heavy protective equipment, and remain standing for long hours. This duty is better suited for

young, strong, personnel. Finally, MSG work is tedious and demanding, young-enthusiastic people are what make the program succeed. Older Marines, on average, may tire quicker than a younger one and eventually become dissatisfied with the monotony of day-to-day post standing, routine security checks, and repetitive react drills.

Does the MSG program have a discipline problem? The answer is no. The fact that the MSG Battalion enforces fairly rigorous discipline and training standards is the key to the success of the program. While some of the incidents are cause for concern, e.g. sexual assaults and drugs, most are minor when compared to their peers in U.S. society.

Fifteen years ago, many of the MSG maturity and alcohol problems would have been quietly handled at post, conceivably passing a bad MSG onto another unsuspecting post. Today, that Marine either does not make it onto the program, or will eventually commit misconduct at post and be dropped from the program. Society is less tolerant of behavior problems that in the past got a collective sigh of relief and a hardy laugh the day after. For now, MSG Battalion is cognizant of this ever-present hazard and makes a significant effort to supervise and discipline its Marines. The goal is to continue to apply these standards into the future.

Today's MSGs are given the rules of the road and are expected to follow them. Because Marines are the final line of embassy security, they are rigid and unyielding in enforcing security standards in an embassy, it is only appropriate that they be held to a higher threshold of conduct as compared to other embassy tenants. Unfortunately for the Marines, their punishments are more severe than the rest of U.S. Government employees serving overseas.

During the Lonetree review, some in the media were quick to point out that a significant number of MSGs were sent home from post, citing it as a problem. A closer examination has shown that in an overseas mission, the Marines are the only body of personnel that consistently polices itself and enforces its rules on its members. This is both admirable and necessary for the MSG mission to succeed. The State Department has a reputation for frequently letting problem employees run amok in an embassy, creating morale problems for entire sections. And embassy section managers do not always address behavior and performance issues until the problem either manifests itself into greater proportions upon the embassy, or is ultimately passed onto another unsuspecting post.

State Department Foreign Service officers (FSOs), are for the most part, well intentioned, but bookish and non-confrontational. They will either attempt to let the problems sort themselves out, or they will remain on the sidelines out of fear of grievances or legal action from the problem employee. In either scenario, the usual response is to do nothing. These situations result in a loss of credibility from the MSGs at post. This includes a past State Department system that allowed embassy employees who received an exorbitant amount of security violations to escape without discipline.

Many FSOs actually get promoted in spite of numerous security violations, much to the disgust of the MSGs at post. These scenarios (played-out daily in every embassy) greatly affect the collective MSG morale, which can eventually affect the professional performance and personal conduct of highly motivated MSGs who eventually realize that they are on the receiving end of a double standard.

## **Firearms and the Use of Force**

There are two other areas that indicate MSG Battalion has discipline and suitability matters fairly well in hand; the universal respect accorded a MSG is based upon the MSG's high state of military efficiency, resulting in them being armed at post.<sup>27</sup> This military efficiency is one of the primary reasons why Marines are involved in embassy security. MSGs are armed while on duty and have an impressive array of defensive armament at their disposal. This would include pistols, shotguns, submachine guns, and rifles. In some high and critical terrorist threat posts, MSGs are given the rare authority to be armed in their non-working hours and have weapons in their quarters. Yet embassy-shooting incidents are almost nonexistent. In the years 1999-2000, there were only two MSGs removed from post for negligent discharges or unsafe handling of firearms.

Between April 1995 and January 2000, there have been sixteen serious security incidents concerning MSGs and embassies involving firearms, rockets and explosives. These incidents range from robberies of MSGs, embassy evacuations (Monrovia and Pakistan), armed and deranged intruders, and the 1998 bombings of American Embassies Nairobi and Dar Es Salem.<sup>28</sup> In that time, there has been only one recorded instance of a MSG discharging a weapon in the line of duty.

In January 2000 a MSG and a DSS agent fired on an intruder using a stolen embassy vehicle as a weapon against embassy security personnel at American Embassy Moscow. MSG reaction was gauged and professional. A thorough shooting review concluded that the MSG reaction was appropriate. The MSG involved even went as far

as to secure permission to shoot from the DSS agent (not necessarily needed if the MSG was in direct peril).<sup>29</sup>

Local Moscow Police officials also concurred in the proper handling of the incident. This speaks volumes for the training and instruction that MSGs receive in the critical area of firearms and deadly force, especially since Marines are initially trained to be aggressive combat fighters. In the end, MSGs are taught to use restraint and think before acting.

A contributing factor to the low level of firearm discharges and force-related incidents is in the teaching of a force continuum to MSG recruits. Force continuum teaches a gradual escalation of force. The MSG is taught that there are stages and degrees of force that are to be used to meet a threat before resorting to either serious physical force or firearms. The main theme of the theory is in understanding the appropriate amount of force to be given in response to a threat. For example, a MSG should not display a firearm to force a loitering, but unarmed visitor to comply with commands to leave the consulate section.

On the other hand, a MSG may not attempt to offer a verbal command to leave the premises to an intruder wielding a knife. If the intruder is an imminent physical threat to the MSG or others, the MSG could immediately resort to his firearm if the situation warranted it. The MSG force continuum ranges from verbal commands, to open and closed hand controls, to impact weapons (side handled baton), chemical mace, (batons and mace are referred to as intermediate control weapons), and finally, firearms. An established force continuum keeps both MSGs and perpetrators safer.



In the end, the MSG understands both the tactical situations that he/she is in and the appropriate response needed to render the situation safe. Normally, control techniques are at one level above the force or resistance being offered by the assailant. Force continuum consistently works and is a professional application to incidents that occur in international atmospheres that may result in considerable news coverage. There are still law enforcement agencies that lack the combination of both intermediate control weapons and an understanding of force continuum. It is a great credit to the MSG Battalion and DSS that MSGs receive this valuable training.

Since 1993, there have only been two suicides involving MSGs deployed on the program; the last incident was in 1994. Both MSGs used their issued handguns to kill themselves. Considering the young age of MSGs, the potential for young adults to become despondent over relationships, their isolation in overseas posts, and immediate access to weapons, it is a tribute to the screening and selection procedures that the number is so low.

### **The MSG Program and DSS**

Operationally, embassy security is a cooperative partnership between the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) and the MSG Program. DS furnishes the RSOs that coordinate overall embassy security. While the MSG detachment administers and disciplines itself, the RSO has the operational control of the detachment. Therefore, the detachment is subordinate to the RSO, who manages security on behalf of an ambassador. An ambassador is ultimately responsible for the security of an embassy. For the most part, this system of two organizations working for the common goal of embassy security and integrity works quite well. Yet there are some areas that can be

improved upon. MSG detachments are fairly efficient units that both police and administer themselves well, perhaps too well. Again, we must examine the training phase.

Presenting courses of instruction is accomplished under the purview of the director of the MSG school, a colonel who is also the battalion commander. He is assisted by the officer-in-charge, who, in turn, supervises nine instructor/advisors and two Department of State instructors. As previously stated, one of the contributing factors to the success of MSG training is in having former MSG Program personnel teaching both from the manual, and from their respective experiences of past embassy security assignments. This should also prove true for the Department of State instructors, but the input from the Diplomatic Security Service is not at the same level as the MSG side of the house.

There are approximately eighty subjects of instruction in MSG school; DSS only participates in the instruction of twenty-two of them. Of the twenty-two subjects taught by DSS, the full time DSS instructors only participate in twelve of them, with other visiting instructors from DSS teaching the remaining ten. Out of a total of forty-seven training days in MSG school, DSS makes a representational appearance in but eighteen of them, or only one third of the courses.<sup>30</sup>

The DSS instructors permanently assigned to MSG Battalion are charged with teaching courses during seven days of school. Some of the courses taught by the DSS side, such as handcuffing, weapons, fire alarms, explosives, first aid, and destruction of controlled materials are better suited for Marine instructors. Furthermore, some of the more seminal subjects such as Terrorist Operations, Fraternization and Contact

Reporting, Handling Walk-Ins (persons who approach an embassy and offer potential intelligence), Foreign Intelligence Threats, and Appropriate Conduct in a Foreign Country are taught by Marine instructors.

While MSG instructor/advisors provide adequate instruction using pre-planned lessons, approved by both MSG Battalion and DSS, DSS can help improve the product given to the students. Former RSOs have a wealth of specific subject matter expertise who can not only teach and lecture on a wide range of issues, but also can elaborate from real experience and explain how both MSGs and RSOs execute security at post. At a minimum, there could be additional DSS presence in at least twenty assorted MSG subjects that are now exclusively taught by the MSG instructor/advisor. Regardless of how well the battalion can teach the course, there is no input from DSS agents.<sup>31</sup>

An example of such is found in one of the courses that are taught to new MSGs: “Introduction to the CIA.” Because this subject is presented by an outside agency representative and covers the sensitive subject of the CIA in an embassy, it is important for DSS to know what is being given to MSGs from an outside agency. Instructors do not always stick to the lesson plan and young Marines are impressionable. It is important to ensure that MSG candidates fully understand which organization they serve at post. Finally, the two full-time State Department instructors that currently represent DSS at the MSG Battalion are not special agents, nor have they performed RSO duties in an embassy. While their contributions to the school are worthwhile and they make a credible impact on the students, DSS should provide DSS instructors with RSO experience to the MSG Battalion.

At times, DSS instructors have failed to arrive to give scheduled classes to MSGs. This inability of DSS to meet its demands has caused the MSG battalion to become self-reliant and to not request or depend on DSS for assistance. This is why MSG instructor/advisors teach the lion's share of the course curriculum. This also damages the credibility of DSS in the eyes of the MSG Battalion. To the Marines, missing a scheduled commitment is an affront to their engrained professionalism. Yet, a credibility problem is just what DSS has in the eyes of the MSG Battalion.

This lack of DSS participation will result in MSG trainers becoming insulated and eventually teaching the courses from a MSG perspective, which is not good for the overall effectiveness of the program. This has the potential to mislead and then confuse MSGs who must work under the auspices of the RSO at post. An RSO assigned to MSG training can only enhance the product given to MSG candidates. MSGs need to hear the RSO perspective on both MSG topics and real world security scenarios; provided that a properly qualified, credible, and experienced DSS person is assigned to MSG School.

When queried, several MSG trainers intimated that the presence of a DSS special agent with RSO experience at MSG school was not really necessary, that current instructor input was adequate. Yet, the MSG instructors/advisors interviewed were not adverse to a journeyman DSS special agent being present during MSG training, as long as the DSS representative could teach all of the subjects that the Marine instructors teach so as not to lose credibility with the MSG recruits. While a valid point, it is unrealistic to be proficient in every single course. A respectable percentage of courses, spread out across the six-week program would be sufficient. The point here is to have a DSS presence exposed to the MSG candidate during the entire length of the school.

The DSS instructor should not act as a spy or class monitor, but should be an intricate part of the teaching environment. If done properly, both students and instructors alike would readily warm-up to their presence. This person should be assigned full time, and at a minimum for a two-year period. Such action would begin DSS in establishing greater continuity with the MSG Battalion. Two DSS instructors would be preferable to one, but DSS, like the MSG Battalion, has manpower concerns.

In the fourth week of training, a MSG screening board must review all recruits. The board reviews the recruit's performance to date, talks about any noted shortfalls in performance, and essentially gives the recruits an opportunity to assess themselves before a decision is rendered to retain them in the program. The review is relevant given that it highlights potential problems onto the table in frank openness. It is a credit to the program that the review is done in this fashion. Once again, credibility is present in the current program.

The screening board consists of five persons: the chief MSG instructor, the officer in-charge of the school (a major), the sergeant major of the battalion, the battalion psychologist and a representative from the State Department. A DSS special agent with RSO experience sits on the review board approximately 50% of the time, with the remaining panels being represented by the DSS/MSG program manager. Unfortunately, the DSS/MSG program manager is a civilian employee. The program manager is not a special agent nor has that person ever been an RSO.

In essence, this person, regardless of good intention or familiarity with the workings of the MSG program, is not qualified to pass judgement on the potential of a MSG candidate to serve in an embassy. Only an agent with RSO experience is capable

of fulfilling that requirement. In the past, DSS has had a problem meeting all of its professional mandates; so sundry administrative tasks get passed onto others less capable by default.

This is neither the fault of, nor necessarily a problem for the Marine Corps. The Marines are capable and happy to handle their personnel decisions without input from any outside influences. Generally, an organization is more comfortable with their own people. The current memorandum of agreement calls for a State Department professional security officer to be on the review panel. MSG Battalion leaves it up to DSS to supply a qualified professional; in the past, DSS has not adequately met this requirement. In turn, the MSG Battalion dominates the panel.

The concern is not that the MSG personnel cannot be trusted, but that embassy security is a partnership between security professionals. When DSS fails to provide the proper personnel, their stature is diminished in the eyes of the MSG Battalion; DSS implies that the MSG mission is not important enough to assign agents to. In turn, MSG instructors will have added cause to become insulated in their dealing with DSS and the Department of State. This atmosphere may eventually pass itself from the instructors onto the new detachment commanders in-training and eventually onto the enlisted watch standers assigned to an embassy. A full time DSS special agent assigned to the MSG Battalion could help prevent this condition.

Currently, seven persons staff the DSS/MSG Program; none are agents, and some are contract employees. The lack of special agents in the MSG Program may telegraph to the MSG personnel that DSS is not as focused on fulfilling their commitment to the program as the Marine Corps. This is not to say that the DSS-MSG office is not

doing its job, but the addition of an agent can only make the office more responsive and productive. MSG training has become, by default, a totally Marine Corps driven show in MSG school. In the end, this can only hurt the partnership; both sides are becoming separate franchises. This could ultimately affect MSG decision-making and response to RSO directions at a mission, possibly effecting post security.

In fairness to DSS, there are other avenues of contact with the MSG Battalion. DSS Overseas Operations Division (DS/OP) has unlimited contact with battalion officers concerning operational issues for overseas posts. The director of DS/OP and his chief deputies are all highly experienced agents who have performed numerous overseas tours as RSOs. DS/OP agents are present at the annual Battalion Commanders Conference. MSG Battalion officers are not averse to interacting with DS; most would welcome a greater exposure and firmer partnership with DSS.

Unfortunately, DSS Headquarters is located in Washington D.C., and the MSG Battalion is located in Quantico, VA. Furthermore, there is no Marine Corps liaison officer assigned to DSS Headquarters. If a position was created, this officer could assist the MSG program manager as well as assist DS/OP and the Training Center regarding any MSG/DSS issues. Currently, there is no daily person-to-person contact between DSS and MSG Battalion officers; this shortfall prevents a greater operational efficiency for all.

### **Should the State Department Continue to use MSGs?**

If a uniformed MSG posted in an embassy is a stark contradiction to the spirit of a diplomatic mission, why are they still used when there are numerous private security guard services available? In consideration to taxpayers, shouldn't young Marines, who are admittedly some of the best in the Corps, be returned to Fleet Marine Force

assignments? The answer is the no. The mere presence of uniforms and weapons do not keep diplomatic missions secure. The United States Marine Corps is the best-suited organization, to continue embassy security duty.

Much like the countries they are located in, no two embassies are alike. While set-up the same internally, they all derive a flavor from the locality and culture they are situated in. This is also true of the various local guard force services offered in each country, no two are the same. In fact, some countries have no private guard services at all to offer. In those cases, DSS must hire, train, and discipline their own home-grown local guard force. This is true even of similar countries in the same region. One guard service can be highly professional while another is nothing more than a gaggle of glorified doormen and slovenly gatekeepers. In some European countries, while highly professional, uniformed guard services, can per guard, per year, exceed what a cleared American earns at post.

Local guard services are designed to be passive; they maintain perimeter security and bridge the security strata between the host police, the RSO and the MSG detachment. One of the reasons embassies have local guard forces is because many countries object to having armed foreign military personnel (to include MSGs) outside of an embassy proper. Because local guard contractors vary from post to post, they lack continuity in the critical areas of training, operational competence, work ethic, literacy, and equipment.

There is also no correlation between the professionalism of guard forces in relation to the in-country threat. Unless intensively trained and monitored, a local guard force will have extreme difficulties in adjusting its duties and vigilance as security situations ebb and flow in an atmosphere of direct and implied terrorist threats.



The MSG program eliminates all of these local shortfalls and concerns. The MSG program has standardized equipment, training, and performance standards that cross international boundaries. An MSG detachment is interchangeable with any embassy; it is a universal fit. One could literally take the MSG detachment in Tokyo and move it to Buenos Aires and have it functional upon arrival. This is the advantage to having standardized training and operational procedures. This is what the Marine Corps does for the Department of State. While defensive in design, MSGs are the last bastion of reliable security that must be maintained if U.S. embassies are to remain secure in foreign environments.<sup>32</sup>

In the past, an argument was made for cleared American contractors with appropriate background checks to perform the role of MSGs. This is not in the best interests of the United States Government. The explanation is two-fold, with the first being cost. In perspective, Marines are cheap, very cheap. While the Department of Defense pays for MSGs salaries, the operational cost of the entire MSG program was a mere \$35 million dollars in FY 2000. This includes housing, furniture, travel, vehicles, and equipment for approximately 1200 MSGs serving in 125 locations, and an additional eight regional company headquarters. Another 100 Marines serve at Battalion Headquarters, Quantico. While it sounds like a lot, it is not a bad deal for the American taxpayer.

The alternative is not so attractive. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Department of State was using cleared (appropriate security clearances) American guards in several West African embassies for after hour's only protective services. The cost was between \$100,000 and \$200,000 dollars per guard per year. The average MSG only costs

the USG between \$30,000 and \$35,000 per watch stander a year. In comparison, the average State Department employee, at an overseas post, can cost between \$100,000 and \$150,000 in pay and post differential alone. This does not include housing, which in some European and Asian countries can cost double the U.S. employee's salary. These costs can quickly become astronomical when attempting to apply a standardized, uniform security program, run by private, U.S. contractors worldwide.<sup>33</sup>

The second benefit that the program has over contractors is that the MSG Program literally comes with the full faith and backing of the USG. Job actions, work stoppages and contract disputes are non-existent. As stated, the Marines police themselves with a clear and established command structure. No private guard contractor could ever match professional standards and enforced behavior modification to the degree that the MSG Program does.

A contract guard guilty of misconduct is fired. A MSG guilty of misconduct returns home to face a possible UCMJ proceeding and a less than honorable discharge. MSGs come to post single. This is to keep them focused on their primary duty of responding to the embassy and manning it throughout a security crisis. Because of this, all enlisted Marines are conveniently housed in one designated building called the bachelors enlisted quarters (BEQ) or Marine house. Putting all MSGs in one centrally located domicile without dependants saves an enormous amount of money for both the Department of State and the Department of Defense alike.

The alternative is to have no security guards. Embassy personnel would merely "lock and leave" post, activating an alarm system before departing. In the past, this has been done in many of the smaller, regional consulates. Unfortunately, it is common

knowledge that numerous security services, hostile to the United States, have the technical expertise to surreptitiously penetrate USG premises and office space. Once inside, they can by-pass the most sophisticated of alarms and enter locked rooms and storage containers, obtaining classified information and material. In the morning, returning employees may not suspect a thing. This is the primary reason why the MSG program exists.

In 2001, out of 260 diplomatic missions and consulates, there are still 135 that do not have a MSG Detachment. Luckily, most of these missions are small, perform consular services, and do not keep secret or top secret material. In the past, due to fiscal woes, smaller posts had their MSG detachments deactivated and were turned into lock and leave facilities. As embassy security funding regains importance, many posts are now re-embracing the return of MSG detachments. The future will see more MSG detachments activated in an attempt to negate the above-described scenario for posts that do house classified material.

#### **The Future of the MSG Program: MSG Candidates and the Partnership with DSS**

Much has improved since the MSG - Moscow incident, the MSG Battalion now fields eight regional company commands as compared to five in 1987. In 1987, 25% of the 141 MSG detachments did not have an RSO assigned to provide operation control. In 2001 there is not a single MSG Detachment that lacks an RSO.<sup>34</sup> Yet despite all of the improvements and firewalls installed in training, supervision and candidate screening, several concerns loom large for the MSG Program. Of all previously mentioned, two are of primary importance in 2001.

The first priority, without argument, is the problem of fielding additional quality Marines to support the new posts that will require more MSGs in the near future. For the

Marine Corps, the State Department has looked upon them as an endless supply of manpower and fully expects their commitments to be met. Unfortunately for State, the Marine Corps has its limits, and manpower is currently a big concern for them. Overall, Marine duty is becoming increasingly more detailed and complicated, this places greater demands for intelligent personnel that can use highly technical equipment, and who can do more than basic infantry tasks. Marines are critically needed in artillery, aviation, and traditional expeditionary deployments.

The gamble will come if it is decided to permit less qualified candidates go to posts when in a less demanding time they would not make it. Many of the preventive measures and curriculum that makes the program the success that it is today were installed to prevent another Lonetree episode. Lowering the standards on subjective concerns such as maturity, judgement, and personality shortfalls, is potentially setting-up the Marine Corps and the State Department for another MSG conduct and performance disaster.

Academics is the easier part of training, character, personality, and maturity are the core attributes needed for the program to flourish. “Moscow Station” resulted in numerous law enforcement/security investigations and congressional reviews.<sup>35</sup> If another incident of its type occurred, the Marine Corps would be: one, hard pressed to justify its decision to graduate lesser qualified MSGs, and two, would not find a sympathetic ear at State, in the Congress, or the media; the Marine Corps would be isolated. The MSG program may not survive another episode of the magnitude that it endured in 1987.

The Marine Corps needs to remember that in 1987 some criticized the Marine Corps as an organization rather than the media examining the accused individuals and the

specific shortfalls of the MSG Program. Admirably, the program is better than it has ever been, that is why it is critical to closely scrutinize who gets out of training and goes to post, and who doesn't. This is the most pressing issue facing the program today. To fail in this task is to return to the past.

The MSG program currently fields 1350 Marines in 125 detachments, but in the mid 80s it was larger, 1525 Marines in 141 detachments. It will be difficult to maintain current standards because there are not as many active duty Marines in the year 2001(175,000) as there were in the 1980s(200,000), approximately 25,000 less.

The next major issue of concern for the MSG program is its relationship with the Diplomatic Security Service. There has always been a cordial, but uneasy relationship between the two organizations. Both sides can easily articulate each other's perceived shortfalls. Most Marines see DSS as a weak organization with inconsistent leaders that are not aggressive enough in setting and enforcing embassy security policies and practices. Over time, some RSOs have viewed the MSG program as overly image conscious and self-promoting, and see MSGs as young, naive "hardcharges" who are more willing to use biceps instead of brain matter.

While MSGs are mission critical, RSOs never know if their detachment will possibly become a dreaded liability in the form of off duty incidents and unprofessional behavior. While the partnership works, in the past, there has been a veil of mild distrust and subliminal contempt between the two organizations; this situation must change for the better. Through numerous disconnects mentioned in this paper, neither side fully understands or appreciates the other. It is as if each is a ship en-route to the same destination; each needs the other for support, but each has its own idea of which route to

take. In the end, both need to arrive at the same destination, together. The question is how they will do it.

MSG duty, while narrow in scope, is essential; yet it is but one element of approximately forty overseas security programs that an RSO is responsible for. While DSS basic agents initially undergo six months of training to learn protective security and investigations, these same agents receive only fourteen weeks of RSO training to prepare them for an embassy security assignment. While well received, new RSOs spend only one day at the MSG school getting briefings from MSG trainers, and get only a half-day of MSG management instruction from DSS. More time must be built into the program for each group to learn more about the other. This will prevent misunderstandings in the field.

MSGs, especially detachment and company commanders, want to have a greater influence in embassy security, but lack a complete background (to include statutory authority) to fully understand the dynamics of implementing security in an embassy. Unfortunately for RSOs, much of what they need to accomplish is based on interpersonal relationships, the art of negotiation, and even psychology, vice prompt obedience to security mandates. In an embassy, the desired *fait accompli* often morphs into a *quid pro quo*, issues that are plainly black and white to Marines, quickly evolve into gray for an RSO.

### **Summary**

MSG duty is but a small sliver of the embassy security program and many detachment commanders become disappointed when they are not involved to a greater degree; this will probably never change. No matter how much input the MSG program

wants to provide to embassy security, they will always be subservient to RSOs. Some of the sensed and past experienced MSG frustration exists due to what the State Department demands from the Marines... talented people. The Marine Corps offers-up extremely intelligent and highly trained officers and NCOs to run the MSG program. Their common training, ethos, and education make them frank if not aggressive in articulating what they think should be done.

This does not always gel with what DSS needs to do in order to make embassies safe *and* functional. RSOs have diverse backgrounds, while many have served in either the military or police departments, many have not, and some view MSGs and their military rigidity as both alien and at times, intimidating. In the end, much of what is accomplished in the name of security, and how it is achieved in an embassy, comes down to more a question of style than professionalism. DSS understands better than the Marine Corps that the Department of State has always had an ingrained aversion to security. Security and diplomacy do not mix, but rather coexist; as a rule, strict security measures have traditionally been both resisted and resented by State Department rank and file personnel.

In the aftermath of the Lonetree review, a reeling Marine Corps displayed an effort to distance themselves from the State Department. They deflected some of the blame back onto the State Department and DSS for Clayton Lonetree, citing a lack of DSS/RSO small unit leadership (an accurate criticism that still holds true today), and attempted internally to broach a few feelers at having MSG personnel both supervise and operationally control themselves.

In August of 1987, the Marine Corps acknowledged to the Congressional Subcommittee on Military Personnel that it would make a concerted effort to integrate the MSG command structure with that of the Department of State (DSS) in an effort to ensure integrated operations and communications.<sup>36</sup> Yet fourteen years later, the absence of DSS has the MSG Battalion free from any outside influences. This insulates them and reinforces their segregation, helping foster the Marine spin on embassy security. Yet overseas, Marines complain when the embassy community does not treat them as full partners, they can't have it both ways.

Each group needs to move closer to the middle in understanding each other. The quickest solution to shortening this gap is in assigning full-fledged DS agents into the permanent training cadre in MSG School. Likewise, a MSG Battalion field grade officer should be assigned to DS Operations and the Training Center. New MSGs, especially detachment commanders need to interact and learn about the RSO perspective while in training and not when they arrive at a post.

The MSG program offers up more Marines for embassy security duty than DSS has agents worldwide. DSS has serious manpower and budget issues; through no fault of its own, when DSS fails to fully integrate with the MSG training and recruitment process, it essentially prevents the MSG Program from being better able to assist the very organization that needs them most...DSS. The more DSS interacts with the MSG Program, the more effective the partnership will be overseas. Embassy security is too vital to risk misconceptions from two groups of professionals that need each other to succeed.



Interestingly, the post World War II, pre-Korean conflict undertaking of embassy security duty was a calculated measure of preserving the Marine Corps and expanding their mission, gaining favor with then Secretary of State George Marshall and the Truman Administration, in an effort to nullify talks of disbanding the Marine Corps. It was seen as a short-term expediency because Mr. Marshall was displeased with unreliable civilian guards. The Marine Corps never wanted the program on a permanent basis.

Yet a major dividend was quickly realized in 1948, when having MSGs in embassies instead of civilians, saved \$160,750 that year. The USG has been reaping this financial advantage ever since.<sup>37</sup> Fifty-three years later, the Marine Security Guard is as an ingrained image of a Marine to Americans as the Marines that raised the flag on Iwo Jima. The Marine Corps has been a victim of its success.

There is no U.S. military service, federal agency, or private security firm that can provide as complete a professional security component to DSS as the Marine Security Guard Program can. Their proven performance, high operational standards, and economic advantages, makes it the best suited organization to be providing embassy security services to DSS. Nor are they are likely to be replaced; the Marine Corps fully knows what this program means to both the Corps and U.S. national security. They could not jettison the program even if they wanted to, but they don't want to end the partnership.

Despite pains, a few regrettable incidents, and occasional misunderstandings, the Marine Corps is already fully committed to manning the additional needed detachments well into this decade; thereby ensuring uniform security standards for all diplomatic missions that maintain classified material. The State Department greatly benefits from

this once ad hoc agreement that has evolved into one of the finest security programs in existence. Like the British Empire of the nineteenth century, the sun never sets on the Marine Security Guard Program; if the Department of State did not have the MSGs of today, they would have to invent them.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Title:** The United States Marine Corps, the Best Organization to be Providing Security to U.S. Diplomatic Establishments? An Examination of the Marine Security Guard Program and its partnership with the U.S. Department of State.

**Author:** Jeffrey A. Thomas, U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Security Service

**Thesis:** Since 1948 Marines have been formally tasked with providing security to U.S. diplomatic missions. In the past, assigning young Marines to delicate foreign environments has resulted in incidents that have ranged from unprofessional conduct to espionage. Are there better alternatives to the USMC? Marines provide embassy security in partnership with the Diplomatic Security Service; this partnership can be improved to the betterment of the mission.

**Discussion:** Since its inception in 1791, Department of State diplomats have been escorted and protected by U.S. Marines. What started as an ad-hoc partnership of necessity has evolved into a formal partnership between organizations. However, Marines are trained war fighters and are a stark contradiction to the highly educated diplomats who traditionally inhabit our embassies. Most embassy Marines are extremely young, and over the years, numerous avoidable incidents have occurred at overseas posts. Approximately 30% of all MSGs are removed from the program either in training or at post. This is because the MSG Program: one, sets conduct and academic standards that must be upheld, and two, do in-fact enforce discipline on their personnel. The key to a successful MSG detachment is the selection and training of the detachment commander. This Marine monitors both the detachment and is also the bridge between the detachment and the remainder of post.

Embassy security is a partnership with the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). DSS provides regional security officers (RSOs) who manage embassy security on behalf of an ambassador at post and operationally manage the MSG detachment. While awkward, this unique partnership works quite well in spite of general misunderstandings. Marines and RSOs have a different ethos and style in approaching embassy security. DSS has a minimal presence during the training of MSGs. This lack of presence can add to future misunderstandings at post and permits MSG trainers to approach embassy security from only a Marine perspective. This must change if the program is to continue to excel and grow. Recently, the Marine Corps has agreed to staff an additional thirty-four posts. This will place a greater burden on sending MSGs to post in spite of the high standards demanded on them by all.

**Conclusion:** The MSG Program's high removal rate is not a cause for concern and in-fact validates the program; they are the only organization to be found in an embassy that consistently enforces performance and discipline standards. MSG training is professional, it removes personnel determined not able to serve successfully, and prepares the remainder for the unique demands of embassy security duty. DSS must play a greater role in training MSGs. However, in the past, DSS has a spotty record in meeting their responsibilities of supporting the program. Both must make an effort to better accommodate the other. If this is done the program will mature and continue to improve.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Clyde H. Metcalf, *A History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: Van Rees Press, 1939) 41

<sup>2</sup>President Warren G. Harding in a 1921 directive to the U.S. Marine Corps to protect the U.S. Mail, Marine Corps Air and Ground Museum exhibit, Quantico, VA.

<sup>3</sup>Alan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York, The Free Press, 1980) 137

<sup>4</sup>Millett, 137, 164, 214, 216, 217; United States Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Brochure, "*A History of Excellence, The Marine Security Guard Program*" (USDOS Publication, Washington, DC, January 1999), 3-4

<sup>5</sup>United States Senate Select Committee, Report on Security at the United States Missions in Moscow and Other Areas of High Risk, Washington DC, GPO, September 9, 1987, 5

<sup>6</sup>Marine Security Guard Battalion Historical Archives, 1947–1968, Highlights of The First Ten Years, 1947–1957, Marine Security Guard Battalion Quantico, Virginia, 3. Cited hereafter as MSG Historical Archives, *Highlights of First Ten Years*.

<sup>7</sup>Raymond Barrett, "*The Embassy Marine*," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1967, 134-135; Millett, 137, 164, 214, 216, 217; United States Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Brochure, "*A History of Excellence, The Marine Security Guard Program*" (USDOS Publication, Washington, DC, January 1999), 1-8

<sup>8</sup>Major General Carl E. Mundy Jr., USMC, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, Statements made before the Defense Policy Panel and Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives Concerning the Marine Security Guard Program, 5 August 1987 (House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 1987), Cited hereafter as Major General Mundy, *1997 Statement to Congress Concerning the MSG Program*.

<sup>9</sup>Marine Security Guard Battalion, New Arrival Briefing Presentation, 13 October, 2001 (MSG Battalion, Quantico Virginia), 1. Cited hereafter as *MSG New Arrival Briefing*.

<sup>10</sup>United States Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Brochure, "*A History of Excellence, The Marine Security Guard Program*" (USDOS Publication, Washington, DC, January 1999), 14-15

<sup>11</sup>1987 Company A Office Hours Record From MSG Detachment American Embassy Moscow, Marine Security Guard Battalion Archives, Quantico, Virginia.

<sup>12</sup> Rodney Barker, *"Dancing With The Devil,"* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 148.

<sup>13</sup> Lieutenant Commander Victor Huertas, USN, clinical psychologist, Marine Security Guard Battalion, interview with author, 25 September 2000.

<sup>14</sup> Huertas, interview.

<sup>15</sup> Huertas, interview.

<sup>16</sup> Captain Michael E. Sayegh, USMC, Marine Security Guard Battalion, Judge Advocate, interview with author, 13 October 2000.

<sup>17</sup> United States Marine Corps, Marine Security Guard Battalion, *MSG School Cumulative Statistics Report for FY 2000*, loose leaf, Judge Advocate's Legal Brief, 2000.

<sup>18</sup> MSG *New Arrival Briefing*, 17.

<sup>19</sup> MSG Historical Archives, *Highlights of First Ten Years*, 3.

<sup>20</sup> MSG *New Arrival Briefing*, 8.

<sup>21</sup> United States Marine Corps, Marine Security Guard Battalion, *Removals for Cause Percentages 1995-2000*, loose leaf, Judge Advocate's Legal Brief, 2000.

<sup>22</sup> United States Marine Corps, Marine Security Guard Battalion, *Analysis of DOS Marine Security Guard Program Disciplinary Infractions List and a Review of MSG Battalion Files*, Marine Security Guard Battalion Archives, April 1988.

<sup>23</sup> United States Marine Corps, Marine Security Guard Battalion, *Basis for Removals for Cause for 1999- 2000*, loose leaf, Judge Advocate's Briefing, 2000.

<sup>24</sup> Student Outline: *Appropriate Conduct in a Foreign Country*, United States Marine Corps, Marine Security Guard Battalion, Course 1911, (Quantico, Virginia: GPO, July 1995), 4.

<sup>25</sup> Sayegh, interview.

<sup>26</sup> Robert O'Brien, Director, Office of Overseas Operations, Diplomatic Security Service, worldwide telegram sent to all Regional Security Officers, Subject: "Security of Marine Security Guard Personnel," SECSTATE telegram 130632, 10 July 2000.

<sup>27</sup> Student Outline: *Use of Deadly Force*, United States Marine Corps, Marine Security Guard Battalion, Course 221S, (Quantico, Virginia: GPO, 8 October 1998), 1.

<sup>28</sup>United States Marine Corps, Marine Security Guard Battalion, *Incidents Involving MSGs and Firearms and Explosives Since 1 January 1995 to 10 January 2000*, loose leaf, Marine Security Battalion Archives, 2/25/2001.

<sup>29</sup>Sayegh, interview.

<sup>30</sup>Marine Security Guard Battalion internal memorandum from Commanding Officer to Distribution List. Subject: "Training Schedule for Staff Noncommissioned Officers and Marine Security Guards," Class 05-2000, 24 July-15 September 2000, 15 May 2000, 2-52.

<sup>31</sup>These additional MSG subjects could be improved by the participation of DSS Agents in MSG Guard School:

MSG Security Responsibilities	Detachment Commander Responsibilities
Security Violation Procedures	Tactical Planning and Operations Orders
Appropriate Conduct In a Foreign Country	Intruder Containment Plans
Use of Force Continuum	Ethics
Shooting Scenarios	Introduction to Terrorism
Terrorist Operations	Foreign Intelligence Threats
Introduction to the CIA	Fraternization and Contact Reporting
Handling Walk-ins	Bomb Plans
Stresses of Command (for Det Cmndrs)	Use of Deadly Force
Internal Defense Plans	Diplomatic Status and Immunities

<sup>32</sup>Department of State, Report of The Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, "Guard Forces," (Washington, DC: DOS Publication June 1985) 60-63.

<sup>33</sup>Brenda Ferry, Program Manager, Marine Security Guard Program, Diplomatic Security Service, interview with author, 27 September 2000.

<sup>34</sup>Douglas Allison, Special Assistant to the Director, Diplomatic Security Service, interview with author, 24 September 2000.

<sup>35</sup>Research conducted for this paper has determined that the following is a non inclusive list of organizations that conducted investigations, reviews, audits or inquiries subsequent to the Clayton Lonetree/Arnold Bracey MSG espionage affair: Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Naval Investigative Service, Department of State, U.S. Marine Corps, Department of the Navy Inspector General, President's Foreign Intelligence Oversight Board, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Senate Governmental Affairs' Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, House Permanent Subcommittee for Intelligence, and Defense Counterintelligence Board.

<sup>36</sup>Major General Mundy, *1997 Statement to Congress Concerning the MSG Program*.

<sup>37</sup>MSG Historical Archives, *Highlights of First Ten Years*.

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